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THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE JUDICIARY: A NEED 
FOR CO-OPERATION OR REFORM? 
By George P. Smith, II* 
I. INTRODUCTION: PROPOSALS FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT 
The recent increase in environmental litigation, the detailed spe-
cialized legislation which has been enacted on the subject, the 
highly sophisticated technology involved in new methods of pollu-
tion control, and the increasing involvement of the judiciary in re-
viewing the beneficial and adverse effects of ongoing programs have 
resulted in a number of proposals for the establishment of an inde-
pendent environmental court. 1 Such a court, it is claimed, would be 
able to develop a technical expertise analogous to that of the Tax 
Court, an expertise which is necessary for the just resolution of the 
complex environmental issues presented by current litigation. 
The impetus for one such proposal was supplied by the Supreme 
Court's refusal, in 1971, to exercise its original jurisdiction in Ohio 
v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,2 because of complex technical ques-
tions in which it had no expertise. This decision has been cited as a 
justification for the development of a special environmental court 
which would have sole jurisdiction over environmental lawsuits.3 
Whatever potential there may be for developing environmental ex-
pertise in the lower Federal courts, it can never be realized, accord-
ing to this argument, because of the pressure of increasingly 
crowded dockets! The alleged complexity of environmental cases is 
said to create a need for uniformity and consistency similar to that 
created by the Federal tax system.5 Finally, it is asserted that exces-
sive delays in preparing and submitting scientific evidence at the 
administrative and judicial levels hinder the entire judicial 
decision-making process, a defect which could be remedied by the 
creation of a specialized court.B 
In the same year in which the Wyandotte decision was handed 
down, the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization 
came out with a proposal for the establishment of a new Administra-
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tive Court, whose functions would bear some similarity to those of 
the environmental-court in the proposal discussed above.7 The pur-
pose of the Administrative Court would be to review the determina-
tions of several agencies involved in the proposed reorganization of 
the independent regulatory commissions, specifically the proposed 
Transportation Regulatory Agency, Federal Power Agency, and Se-
curities and Exchange Agency. 
One strong supporter of an administrative court system has been 
Judge Henry J. Friendly.8 According to Judge Friendly's design, 
such a system would discard the present review of administrative 
action by the ordinary courts, and substitute instead an entirely 
new set of tribunals modeled on the French system of administrative 
courts which culminates in the Conseil D'Etat. Together with this 
proposal, the Judge has suggested that it might well be desirable to 
have a Court of Environmental Appeals which would promote deci-
sional uniformity in the field and develop an expert staff to handle 
unfamiliar problems, thus lifting the complexities of environmental 
law from the shoulders of the general courts.· 
Judge Friendly's proposal has not been universally applauded. In 
a recent article, Judge Harold Leventhal has pointed to several 
serious weaknesses in it.IO First, there is the danger that the selec-
tion of judges would become a political event, with the possibility 
that one or the other interest group might dominate the choice and 
thus "capture" the court." Second, Judge Leventhal asserts that a 
generalist is required in the judicial reviewing process to ensure a 
balance which is coupled with tempered restraint, for it is only the 
generalist who can penetrate scientific data in order to arrive at a 
principled decision which transcends the immediate factual situa-
tion. A specialist, on the other hand, tends to direct his attention 
almost entirely to his own area of expertise, a tendency which dis-
torts the otherwise objective attitude which he might bring to bear 
on environmental issues. 12 Arguing against an activist role for the 
courts in environmental matters, on the grounds that recent federal 
legislation directs implementation through administrative rulemak-
ing and the issuance of orders,13 the Judge would limit the role of 
the courts in this area to a review of the initial actions of executive 
officials and independent regulatory agencies. Together with these 
agencies, he sees the courts as forming a "partnership" to further 
and protect the public interest. J4 In cases where special objective 
expertise is needed, Judge Leventhal would advocate the more fre-
quent use of expert witnesses, Masters, or even the appointment of 
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full-time scientific experts to serve the appellate courts in the review 
process. 15 
The issues raised by these and other_ similar proposals prompted 
Congress to authorize, in Section 9 of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments, a study of the feasibility of establishing 
an environmental court which would have exclusive jurisdiction 
over environmental matters. 1ft This mandate was devoid of any hint 
as to the shape and functions of the proposed court,17 and made no 
attempt to define the contours of an "environmental issue". An 
examination of the legislative history of the Act is no more helpful 
in illuminating the Congressional intent. IS The studyl' was carried 
out by the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Justice 
Department which, because of the absence of concrete guidelines 
and of a definition of an environmental issue in the statute, was 
given the responsibility for transforming the broad, abstract man-
date into concrete form. Unfortunately, the study itself, although it 
does present guidelines for the court, never defines an environmen-
tal issue; and the lack of such a definition remains a central problem 
in understanding and analyzing the findings of the report. 
The remainder of this article will deal with the results of that 
study, summarizing the methods employed as well as the specific 
findings. Since the study does not recommend a separate environ-
mental court as a solution, an alternative approach aimed at sharp-
ening the contours of environmental law through education of the 
judiciary will be discussed briefly. It is not the aim of this article to 
present a full-blown conceptual alternative to the idea of an envi-
ronmental court, but rather to suggest further areas for considera-
tion. 
II. HISTORY AND METHOD OF THE STUDY 
The approach of the Justice Department study was to explore the 
feasibility of establishing an environmental court system, compare 
it with the existing judicial system, and make recommendations as 
to whether a specialized court could better handle environmental 
litigation than the existing system.20 
A. Analytical Approach 
In order to transform the abstract mandate into concrete recom-
mendations, the study developed three models of specialized court 
systems as analytical tools, and presented these models to various 
private groups and Federal agencies known or believed to have an 
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interest in environmental problems, for comments. 21 
Briefly, the first model was an environmental court which would 
hear environmental cases generally. It would be fashioned along the 
lines of the Court of Claims in that it would have original jurisdic-
tion, handled by a group of commissioners or trial judges, and ap-
pellate jurisdiction consisting of a panel of judges. The court would 
have exclusive jurisdiction over environmental cases. Exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction would exist as of right from the decisions of 
its trial court, as well as from environmental orders of federal agen-
CIes. 
The second model was an environmental court whose sole func-
tion would be to review orders of federal agencies affecting the envi-
ronment. It would consist of a panel of judges, and would have 
exclusive jurisdiction to review such administrative orders. 
The third model also consisted of a panel of judges having exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review orders of designated federal agencies, or 
of specified types of matters handled by such agencies. It differed 
from the second in that the second model revolved around a definite 
institutional structure-i.e., a court-while the third involved 
merely a loose or unstructured grouping of judges. 
For each model it was assumed that the court would have exclu-
sive jurisdiction; that once jurisdiction was exercised the court 
would have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve or review all related 
legal issues, the environmental court's decisions being reviewable 
only by the Supreme Court upon certiorari; that they would be 
constitutional courts (under Article III) rather than legislative 
courts; and that there would be no change in the scope of judicial 
review now available in the federal courtS.22 
B. Empirical Approach 
Although the model systems provided an analytical approach to 
the problem, the study also collected empirical data in order better 
to understand the area of environmental litigation. The data was 
collected by soliciting comments from federal agencies and non-
governmental organizations. 23 The following information was sought 
from each organization: 
1. Its total litigation experience in terms of new cases since 
January 1, 1970. 
2. The percentage of such cases having significant environmental 
issues. 
3. The percentage of such cases having minor or tangential 
environmental issues. 
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4. Its opinion of the ability of the courts generally to handle 
technical environmental issues. 
5. Its preference among the three model court suggestions. 
6. Any suggested alternatives it might have to the proposed 
models. 24 
C. Definition of an Environmental Case 
It is undisputed that the number of environmental cases has in-
creased recently, but the initial question is what exactly constitutes 
an "environmental case". This term remains undefined throughout 
the study, yet it is critical to an accurate analysis of the empirical 
and analytical data. How can an agency speak of the percentage of 
its cases having significant environmental issues when the term 
"environmental issue" remains undefined?25 How can one discuss 
the practicality of an environmental court having exclusive jurisdic-
tion over environmental cases, when one is not really sure what 
constitutes an environmental case? The statistical problems of the 
report and, more importantly, the jurisdictional problems of the 
environmental court are so clearly present throughout the study as 
to give it an air of fantasy. Attempting to study the feasibility of an 
environmental court system without first defining what is an envi-
ronmental issue and an environmental case, is putting the prov-
erbial cart before the horse. 
D. Jurisdiction of an Environmental Court 
A serious jurisdictional problem in setting up an environmental 
court follows from this definitional dilemma. Since such a court 
would have exclusive jurisdiction over environmental cases, the def-
inition of an environmental case would have to be concrete and 
precise. 26 "The fact is that nearly any controversy may have an 
environmental aspect to it, especially if it involves actions of the 
Federal Government,"27 and almost any environmental case would 
also involve non-environmental issues. Therefore, the lines to be 
drawn between environmental and non-environmental cases for ju-
risdictional purposes are ones of degree rather than kind, and create 
a very serious potential for forum-shopping. If a case would be 
deemed environmental or non-environmental on the basis of its 
pleadings, an attorney could choose to emphasize the environmental 
or non-environmental aspects of the case, depending on whether or 
not he felt it desirable to have that particular case decided by the 
special court. The decisions of the special environmental court 
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would be studied to determine whether or not it would be advisable 
for the plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of that court. 28 Such 
forum-shopping would inhibit the development of any definable and 
consistent body of environmental law. This problem is the direct 
result of the lack of any definition of an "environmental case," and 
the requirement of exclusive jurisdiction of the environmental court 
over all environmental cases. 
A corollary to this problem is the situation in which an environ-
mental court might gain jurisdiction over a case that involved envi-
ronmental issues only tangentially. 29 The main issue might not be 
environmental, but because of the nature of the complaint, the case 
would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the environmental 
court. It is assumed that the court, once jurisdiction is invoked, 
would have jurisdiction to decide all related issues. As the Council 
on Environmental Quality observed, this could lead to the estab-
lishment of two lines of precedent between the environmental court 
and the federal district courts on similar issues. "The result would 
be that separate lines of precedent would grow up on important 
issues that often arise in environmental cases, such as questions of 
administrative law. "30 
E. Growth of Environmental Litigation 
The study indicated that although environmental litigation has 
had a dramatic impact upon the government and upon society gen-
erally, it has not had a very significant impact upon the total case-
load of the federal courtS.31 "As of June 30, 1972, there were 101,032 
civil cases and 25,483 criminal cases pending in the U.S. district 
courts. In addition, there were 9,939 cases pending in the courts of 
appeals. At the same time, there were approximately 860 cases 
pending before those courts which could be identified as environ-
mental. These constitute, then, less than seven-tenths of one per-
cent of the total case load."32 In addition, the responses of the agen-
cies solicited indicated that the proportion of the total agency litiga-
tion represented by environmental litigation was small. Two excep-
tions to this pattern were the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the Atomic Energy Commission.33 The figures demonstrate that 
even environmentally active agencies are involved in much non-
environmental litigation.34 Also, a sampling of non-environmental 
agencies indicates that the percentage of cases with environmental 
issues is insignificant.35 The study thus suggests that environmental 
litigation cannot be seen as a serious burden on the existing court 
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system,38 nor has it had a numerically significant impact on the total 
agency litigation workload.37 These statistics appear to comprise all 
environmental cases, those whose central issue is environmental, as 
well as to those in which environmental considerations are only 
tangentially involved. Assuming, arguendo, that a court with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over environmental cases would handle only the 
former category (Le., where the central issues are environmental), 
it appears that only 'a very small percentage of the federal court 
workload would be alleviated thereby. The environmental court, 
therefore, does not seem to be any solution to the increasingly heavy 
case load of the federal courts revealed in the Freund report.38 
lIT. PROBLEMS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT 
The agencies solicited in the study were asked whether the pro-
posed environmental court could handle environmental litigation 
better than the existing court system, and the reasons for their 
conclusions. The comments given by the agencies outline a number 
of problems, in addition to the jurisdictional ones cited above, 
which such a specialized court would encounter. 
A. Lack of Institutional Strength 
While the federal court system is a central institution indispensa-
ble to our system of government, other specialized court systems 
have existed contemporaneously with it, for instance the Tax Court 
and the Court of Claims. In order for these specialized courts to 
survive and succeed, it has been necessary for them to develop "in-
stitutional strength." Institutional strength is initially derived from 
active support for the establishment of such courts by the special-
ized bar interests who would be involved in practice before them. 
This initial support is vitally important for the subsequent evolu-
tion of "institutionalized" strength, following the establishment of 
the court. Once established, the court can draw on this strength in 
order to develop its own character. 
The comments of the agencies solicited reflect their lack of enthu-
siasm for the proposed environmental court.38 The emphasis of the 
comments was not on problems the court might create or suffer 
from, but rather on the lack of any need for its establishment in the 
first place.40 The view of the Environmental Protection Agency was 
typical: "We see no need for the establishment of a court or a court 
system . . . we think it would be a mistake to view environmental 
matters as a specialized and isolated field of law."41 The report 
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expresses the prediction that without the necessary institutional 
strength, the court would not be able to withstand the pressures 
likely to be thrust upon it by special interest groups.42 
B. Judicial Difficulties-Rigidity and Inefficiency 
Another concern of the agencies, expressed eloquently by the Con-
servation Foundation, is the possibility that the judges may develop 
rigid approaches to the issues and become partial to certain parties 
involved in environmental litigation. The Conservation Foundation 
predicted that the appointment of judges to deal exclusively with 
environmental issues would involve more political pressures from 
interest groups than the appointment of judges to decide a variety 
of issues, and because these judges would decide only environmental 
cases they would lose the broad perspective so necessary to the 
decision of an environmental case. The Conservation Foundation 
concluded that the result would be "the loss of perspective, of broad 
experience, of learning and of intellectual cross-fertilization which 
must necessarily result from the segregation of environmentallitiga-
tion . . . "43 
One of the principal arguments in favor of the establishment of 
the environmental court is that it might be more efficient in dealing 
with environmental litigation. A part of this efficiency would be the 
ability to respond quickly to environmental complaints-using that 
word in its technical, pleadings sense. Yet the study concludes that 
just the opposite result would occur with a special court. It argues 
that because of the numerically small caseload of the court, it would 
be reasonable to assume that the court would be centrally located, 
rather than spread throughout the country as are the federal district 
courts. If it is true that much environmental litigation arises out of 
conflicts of local concern, having significant localized repercussions, 
it would seem that a central court would be less accessible to most 
plaintiffs, and to that extent less responsive to their concerns. The 
net result would be the actual discouraging of local plaintiffs from 
bringing suit in the central environmental court, and those who did 
would have to shoulder, at least initially, the increased cost of such 
litigation attributable to increased transportation expenses for wit-
nesses, etc. Efficiency might also be diminished by the lack of 
knowledge of local affairs and factual settings on the part of the 
judges. "As to the speed with which the court could act, the Conser-
vation Foundation stated that local judges frequently have direct 
knowledge of many local situations and as a result could act more 
quickly and with confidence in emergency situations."44 
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C. Criminal Jurisdiction 
A consideration closely related to the efficiency and jurisdictional 
problems of the proposed environmental court is the question of 
whether or not it would have criminal jurisdiction. Because of con-
stitutional requirements,45 any criminal trial would have to be held 
before a jury in the state where the crime was committed. Therefore, 
for a small percentage of cases the criminal environmental court 
would duplicate the existing district courts, with the obvious result 
of an unwarranted duplication of judicial effort.48 It might be sug-
gested that the environmental court have jurisdiction over civil but 
not criminal suits. However, a closer examination of this possibility 
shows it to be unfeasible. For instance, a significant number of 
federal environmental statutes47 provide for both civil and criminal 
enforcement, and if the criminal enforcement were left to federal 
district courts, there would be two distinct lines of authority inter-
preting the same act.48 
D. Need for Expertise 
The proponents of an environmental court rely most heavily on 
the theory that a special court is necessary to bring needed expertise 
to the complex technical issues in environmental cases. However, 
the report found that in the opinion of the environmental agencies 
and groups solicited, courts now in existence were able to handle all 
technical issues adequately. 49 A variety of explanations were offered 
for these opinions: that it has not been demonstrated that a judge 
needs detailed technical knowledge to perform his function;50 that 
environmental issues involve a mix of statutory interpretation, pol-
icy and fact that are no different from issues which arise in all areas 
of civil litigation;51 that the scope of review is usually limited to 
difficult procedural and legal questions; and that the courts have 
not readily substituted their judgment for that of governmental 
agencies.52 Furthermore, there are methods available to courts for 
the resolution of complex technical problems which may be central 
to a decision. The court may call upon parties and their experts to 
explain the matters involved; it can require that each party submit 
detailed proposed findings of fact; it can ask each party to submit 
briefs on troublesome points; it can appoint special masters or advi-
sory juries.53 
There is also concern that the call for an environmental court to 
handle expertly the technical problems involved in environmental 
litigation might have an adverse affect on resolution of environmen-
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tal cases. Specifically, it is argued that an environmental court 
would concentrate on environmental issues in cases that involve 
many other important, if not crucial, considerations. 54 This overem-
phasis on environmental issues would not be present in a general 
court which would weigh various competing factors. The judiciary, 
skilled in weighing various factors in order to reach a decision, is 
best suited to deal with complex environmental cases because of 
this ability to balance various interests. In order to facilitate this 
process, it would be desirable to educate the judiciary in the 
complexities of environmental law so that this balancing process 
can be accomplished with more efficiency. Thus, instead of creating 
a special court to deal exclusively with the as yet undefined body 
of cases called "environmental," it would be far more effective to 
educate the judiciary in the nuances of environmental issues so that 
they can resolve cases involving these issues with more facility. 
E. Judicial Review 
The agencies expressed the added concern that the environmental 
court might tend to become a superagency, freely substituting its 
judgment for that of the administrative agencies. The courts usually 
will not overturn an administrative determination unless it is arbi-
trary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence.55 As 
stated by the Environmental Protection Agency, " ... the expert 
court could move in the direction of a superagency, usurping func-
tions properly delegated to the agencies. This would be particularly 
so if the court were to regard itself as an expert at least equal to that 
of the agency. "58 
F. Uniformity of Law 
Lastly, where it might be argued that an advantage of the court 
would be to provide uniformity of law in environmental litigation, 
the agencies expressed the view that at this stage, such uniformity 
would not be advantageous. Because of the many unresolved legal 
issues in the area, as well as the undefined contours of the body of 
environmental law, it is important to have various approaches to the 
same issue by lower courts. In addition, it was suggested that the 
need for uniformity might better be served through legislation than 
through judicial action. The impact of legislation in the environ-
mental area is a recent phenomenon. Since 1969, Congress has en-
acted NEP A, 57 the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act58 and the 
1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,58 all 
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of which are viewed as landmarks in the area of environmental 
legislation.60 The impact of these new statutes has not been to define 
and resolve environmental issues, and thus to create a uniform body 
of law. Because of the difficulty of defining and outlining environ-
mental matters, the statutes are of necessity broad, leaving a great 
deal of interpretation and discretion in the hands of the agencies 
and the courts which administer them. In discuss in I{ NEPA, the 
Department of the Navy stated, "while a single environmental court 
might gradually evolve a workable set of guidelines through a judi-
cial decree, it would be a far more productive effort to amplify the 
statute so that the duties and obligations of the agencies are set 
forth in greater detail and with greater clarity."61 The ability of 
legislation to define concisely the guidelines to follow in resolving 
an "environmental issue" has yet to be demonstrated. However, 
Nothing about the new generation of detailed and specialized environ-
mental legislation raises serious questions about the competency of the 
existing federal courts to function effectively in their implementation or 
suggests any particular advantage to be gained through assignment of 
the necessary judicial functions to a specialized court. . . To the extent 
these new statutes place additional responsibilities on the courts, it will 
be because the added administrative duties create a greater likelihood 
for judicial challenges of agency performance.82 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The study strongly recommends that a special environmental 
court not be established at this time. It addressed itself to the main 
arguments advanced by the proponents of the court, i.e. greater 
efficiency, alleviation of the workload of the federal system and the 
need for expertise, and concluded that an environmental court 
would not be the recommended alternative. This conclusion will 
deal with the question the report did not address, that is, is there 
an alternative to an environmental court which will satisfy the de-
mands environmental litigation presently places upon our system? 
Before this question can be answered, an "environmental" case 
must be defined. If such a definition can be developed an alternative 
solution may be more clearly suggested. 
A. Legislative Definition 
It can be suggested that environmental issues may be defined 
legislatively, by the enactment of statutes which resemble the Inter-
nal Revenue Code more than they do NEPA. NEPA is written in 
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broad and general terms calculated to invite interpretational dis-
pute,63 while the Internal Revenue Code, adopted to deal with mat-
ters involving technical expertise of at least comparable magnitude 
and complexity to that required in environmental litigation, is spe-
cific and not subject to many varying interpretations. The Internal 
Revenue Code has been clarified by the Regulations which provide 
readable interpretations and illustrations of the difficult sections of 
the Code, while no such parallel is as yet available to aid in the 
interpretation of NEPA. 
It is argued that complex environmental matters tend to take 
significantly more judicial time per case than other matters and 
that there is a definite trend toward an increasing volume of envi-
ronmental cases.64 It is therefore apparent that if there were specific 
environmental statutes, they might reduce the amount of time 
spent on each case, or at least help minimize the volume of interpre-
tative disputes on environmental matters. Some states have already 
attempted to define an environmental cause of action legislatively, 65 
although the language is broad and, therefore, often does not delimit 
the area with any degree of certainty. In fact, the sampling of state 
statutes presented in the report appears to increase the present 
problems of ambiguity and vagueness rather than alleviate them. 
By defining the environmental cause of action broadly and by legis-
latively relaxing the standing requirement, the statutes increase the 
volume of environmental cases without creating any new guidelines 
or helping to maintain the present level of efficiency. One trend in 
these statutes has been to give the state courts considerable flexibil-
ity in resolving the issues. Therefore, it would seem that through 
legislation the states have helped increase the volume of environ-
mental litigation and placed an increased burden on the judicial 
system. One must ask whether this trend is necessary in the area of 
environmental litigation, or is NEPA, with its broad policy state-
ments, the best approach in this area? 
As a point of comparison, it must be remembered that the Inter-
nal Revenue Code was enacted to enforce the policy of a constitu-
tional amendment and that the tax regulations are really a legisla-
tive product, generally subject to legislative whim. The body of 
"environmental law", on the other hand, is, at best, a conglomera-
tion of different problem areas with one similarity: their resolution 
involves some relationship between human action and the natural 
environment, whether or not that relationship is the deciding factor. 
What we find when we look at "environmental law," therefore, is a 
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balancing of competing interests. When one of these interests con-
cerns the environment, a case is considered to be environmental 
litigation. This balancing process is no different from the process 
involved in the resolution of most judicial questions. To attempt to 
define by specific statutory language a term such as "environmental 
issue" or "environmental case" would merely complicate the task 
of the courts, and reduce the ability of judges to grapple effectively 
with the application of basic legal concepts to equally basic legal 
problems within an environmental context. 
Obscure matters of scientific theory are not the typical issues 
presented in a so-called environmental case. Instead, the most com-
mon or central questions are those which arise from evidentiary or 
procedural matters. A typical question might be: "What do the facts 
show the effect of a given factor (concentration of a pollutant or use 
of a control method) to be on a given variable (human health, or the 
survival of certain forms of wildlife)?" Inevitably, the court will be 
forced to balance the equities of the particular case, as it does in 
deciding any other type of case.66 
B. Judicial Definition 
The judiciary is the only branch of government capable of this 
case-by-case balancing procedure, and thus it is within this branch 
that any solution to the problems of environmental law must be 
based. This is not to say that in the future legislative alternatives 
will not be successful, but merely that at the present time a legisla-
tive alternative appears premature, since it would inject an unnec-
essary rigidity into a body of law which is now in a state of develop-
ment and flux. A special environmental court having been rejected 
as a solution, another possible approach is the "re-education of 
federal and state judges to the nuances of this new commercially 
packaged body of law, popularly termed environmentallaw."67 For 
present purposes this alternative is the most advantageous from the 
point of view of increasing efficiency and uniformity, and especially 
of facilitating the definition of environmental law. Only by educat-
ing the judiciary in the complexities of this new area can we begin 
to unravel these complexities effectively, and to formulate a defini-
tive approach to environmental problems. 
Unquestionably, the most direct way to undertake the business 
of educating the judiciary is through the establishment of centers 
for judicial education along the lines of that established by Indiana 
University's Indianapolis Law Schoo1.68 There are also other meth-
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ods presently open for exploration and development. The National 
College of the State Judiciary, the Institute for Court Management 
in Denver, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial 
Center in Washington, the American Academy of Judicial Educa-
tion, the Northern American Judges Association, the National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General, the American Bar Association, to-
gether with the state bar association continuing legal education 
programs, are but a few of the most significant tools for training 
judges and lawyers alike in the parameters of environmentallitiga-
tion. 
The New York University Law School's annual Seminar for Ap-
pellate Judges-coordinated by judges themselves in a "self-
teaching" situation-serves as yet another example of an educa-
tional forum for realization or strengthening of environmental skills. 
Federal district court judges also meet on a regular basis to discuss 
ways in which new techniques in judicial administration can be 
used in order to solve current problems. 8D 
McManus and Associates, a management consultant firm in 
Washington, D.C., has recently completed a proposal-undertaken 
at the request of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency-for a very bold and imaginative training program for state 
and local attorneys involved in environmental litigation. When 
funded, this program will go a long way toward educating a large 
segment of the bar to the subtleties of environmental law. When 
both the bench and the bar are totally educated in environmental 
law, a higher standard for the administration of justice will be 
achieved with relative ease, and no reliance upon complex legisla-
tive proposals will be necessary. 
-.~>--.­
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